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This Article presents an economic and legal analysis of border 
measures for climate policy. While the economics of such border 
measures is well-established, there is no clear presumption either for 
or against them in light of current interpretation in both U.S. and WTO 
law. If states unilaterally impose border measures, they may be subject 
to legal challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause and associated 
Foreign Commerce Clause, and even if they pass U.S. legal muster, it 
is very likely they would be challenged through the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. In addition, if a coalition of other countries 
exerts unilateral action on climate, the current U.S. political climate 
suggests that retaliatory use of border measures by other signatories to 
the Paris Climate Agreement might actually play into President 
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that climate change is occurring, a connection exists 
between human activity and emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), and climate change is largely irreversible.1
                                                                                                                     
Andersons Chair of Agricultural Marketing, Trade and Policy, Department of 
Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics, The Ohio State University.
1 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES: PANEL ON 
ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2010); see also Susan Solomon et al., 
Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
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Concentrations of CO2 have increased from pre-industrial levels of 280 parts 
per million (ppm) to the current levels of 400 ppm, with other GHGs increasing 
CO2-equivalent concentrations to 440 ppm.2 At the same time, since 1900, 
average global surface temperatures have risen by 0.80 C, and in the absence of 
mitigation, mean projected global warming will reach 30–40 C by 2100.3 The 
risks associated with climate change include, inter alia, changes in precipitation 
patterns, sea-level rises, more intense and frequent weather, and changes in 
ocean circulation.4
The Stern Report described climate change as the “greatest example of
market failure . . . ever seen.”5 Climate change generates an externality whereby 
the social cost of carbon is not embodied in the price of goods, the standard 
solution being a carbon tax.6 However, because GHG emissions have negative 
consequences irrespective of where they occur, climate change is a collective 
action problem, i.e., the first-best policy is for all governments to mitigate 
climate change.7 Of course, either individual countries or some coalition of 
countries may unilaterally implement climate policy, but necessarily this is a 
second-best outcome as non-activist countries are able to free ride.8
In the past two decades, it has become increasingly obvious that, even 
though negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change in 1997 
was a useful first step, further efforts to develop a comprehensive multilateral 
agreement for reducing carbon emissions will be necessary if climate change is 
to be properly addressed.9 Although the Kyoto Protocol set emission reduction 
targets for individual countries, the agreement was largely ineffective for the 
following reasons: developing countries were not included, the United States
failed to ratify the protocol, and there was no enforcement mechanism.10 More 
recently, the December 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting, held in Paris, resulted in 186 countries 
making commitments to reducing carbon emissions, covering 96% of global 
                                                                                                                     
SCI. U.S. 1704, 1704 (2009) (discussing atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions and 
potential for irreversible climate change).
2 Mai Farid et al., After Paris: Fiscal, Macroeconomic and Financial Implications of 
Climate Change, 2016 IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE 7 (2016).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2007).
6 See Ian Parry, Carbon Pricing, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
ECONOMICS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 47, 47–49 (Timothy C. Haab & John C. Whitehead eds., 
2014).
7 See Michael Hoel, Should a Carbon Tax Be Differentiated Across Sectors?, 59 J.
PUB. ECON. 17, 17–18 (1996).
8 Id. at 18.
9 Jeffrey Frankel, Environmental Effects of International Trade 29–30 (Harv. Kennedy 
Sch. Fac. Res., Working Paper No. RW09-006, 2009).
10 Farid et al., supra note 2, at 26.
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emissions.11 For example, the United States pledged that by 2025 it would 
reduce its GHG emissions to 26%–28% below its 2005 levels.12
Irrespective of the logic supporting a multilateral approach to dealing with 
a global public bad, there has been a shift in many countries from pursuing a 
legally binding international agreement to one where individual countries decide 
on their own carbon emission reduction targets and the policy instruments for 
reaching that target.13 Much of the recent discussion as well as actual application 
of climate policy have focused on the use of market-based instruments such as 
carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS),14 the latter commonly being 
referred to as cap-and-trade.15 As of mid-2015, thirty-nine national governments 
and twenty-three sub-national governments have either implemented or are 
implementing policies designed to generate a market price for carbon.16 The 
majority of these schemes are based on ETSs, e.g., the European Union (EU), 
California, and the nine member states of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont),17 while nineteen
other national governments or sub-national provinces now employ carbon 
taxes.18 However, these instruments only cover 12% of global emissions, and 
when carbon taxes have been employed, they have generally been set well below 
levels consistent with the social cost of emissions.19
Whether a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system is used, the expectation is 
that certain industries that either directly or indirectly account for a large 
proportion of emissions will face increased costs of production.20 As a 
consequence, much of the unilateral climate legislation that has been proposed 
at the national and state level in the United States and elsewhere also includes 
some type of border adjustment measure to be targeted at carbon-intensive 
                                                                                                                     
11 Id. at 6.
12 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y., Fact Sheet: U.S. Reports Its 2025 
Emissions Target to the UNFCCC (Mar. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target.unfccc
[https://perma.cc/D4VJ-DMS8].
13 Farid et al., supra note 2, at 13–14.
14 See Parry, supra note 6, at 48.
15 What Is Emissions Trading?, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/emissions-trading-
resources/what-emissions-trading [https://perma.cc/H26K-DWBL] (last visited Sept. 11, 
2018).
16 See WORLD BANK GRP. & ECOFYS, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING, 10–11
(2015) (ebook); see also Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory 
Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 190–91
(2017) (discussing the attempts that various states and territories have made within the 
United States to adopt lower carbon standards by requiring greater use of renewable forms 
of energy).
17 WORLD BANK GRP. & ECOFYS, supra note 16, at 11, 26 n.20.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 10, 16.
20 See WORLD TRADE ORG. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, TRADE AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 98–99 (2009) [hereinafter TRADE AND CLIMATE].
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imports.21 The inclusion of border adjustment measures in climate change 
legislation is predicated on the following two concerns: first, there will be 
carbon leakage, i.e., production by carbon-intensive industries will be shifted to 
countries with less restrictive climate policies; second, there will be a reduction 
in competitiveness of producers in industries most affected by domestic climate 
policies.22
At the U.S. federal level, a bill sponsored by Representatives Waxman and 
Markey was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in June 2009.23 The 
bill contained provisions relating to border adjustments for U.S. climate 
policy.24 Under Title IV Subpart 2 of the bill, “Promoting International 
Reductions in Industrial Emissions,” the following text appeared with regard to 
the objectives of any multilateral environmental negotiations: “to include in 
such international agreement provisions that recognize and address the 
competitive imbalances that lead to carbon leakage and may be created between 
parties and non-parties to the agreement in domestic and export markets.”25
However, absent any multilateral agreement on GHG emissions, the bill 
contained very clear language about unilateral implementation of border 
adjustments for U.S. climate policy.26 Specifically, if no multilateral agreement 
existed by 2018,27 the President was mandated to implement an international 
emissions allowance program, with requirements being imposed on importers 
no earlier than January 2020.28
The key political reason for the inclusion of border adjustments in the 
Waxman-Markey Act was the need to “secure the votes of Rust Belt lawmakers 
who were wavering on the bill because of fears of job losses in heavy 
industry.”29 Specifically, the provisions were designed to provide some 
protection to those parts of the U.S. manufacturing sector that would face 
                                                                                                                     
21 See id. at 100.
22 See id. at 98–100; see also Madison Condon & Ada Ignaciuk, Border Carbon 
Adjustment and International Trade: A Literature Review 4 (OECD Trade & Env’t, Working 
Paper No. 2013/06, 2009) (discussing and reviewing existing literature on border adjustment 
measures targeted at carbon-intensive imports and their impact on trade and the 
environment).
23 John Larsen et al., WRI Summary of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (Waxman-Markey), WORLD RESOURCES INST. 1, 1 (2009), https://wriorg.s3.
amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/uploads/wri_summary_of_aces_0731.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LY5S-GKT5].
24 Id. at 9.
25 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 766
(a)(2)(A) (2009).
26 Id. § 767(b)(1).
27 Id.
28 See id. § 765(c). 
29 John M. Broder, Obama Opposes Trade Sanctions in Climate Bill: Backs Overall 
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/us/politics
/29climate.html [https://perma.cc/4DSM-CTCY].
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competition from countries with less stringent GHG emissions regulation.30 In 
the words of Representative Sander Levin, “As we act, we can and must ensure 
that the U.S. energy-intensive industries are not placed at a competitive 
disadvantage by nations that have not made a similar commitment to reduce 
greenhouse gases.”31 Representative Levin also argued that, “this legislation 
ensures that the United States will avoid carbon leakage in its energy intensive 
and trade sensitive industries.”32
Although the United States has not yet enacted any federal climate policy 
that puts a price on carbon emissions,33 and the current Administration officially 
informed the United Nations in August 2017 that it will withdraw from the Paris 
Climate Agreement,34 states in the United States explicitly recognize that their 
unilateral implementation of climate policy has the potential for carbon leakage 
and loss of competitiveness by firms located in those states.35 For example, in 
May 2017, Senate Bill 775 was introduced into the California Senate containing 
a proposed border adjustment measure.36 This bill, designed to repeal and 
replace California’s existing cap-and-trade program (Assembly Bill 32), would 
require importers of carbon-intensive products to purchase permits for GHG 
emissions embodied in those products, while exporters of similar products 
would be exempt from purchasing permits.37
                                                                                                                     
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Obama Criticizes Border Tax Adjustments 
in House Climate Bill, 13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 1, 3 (2009).
33 See WORLD BANK GRP. & ECOFYS, supra note 16, at 22.
34 See Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris 
Climate Pact, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-
paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-
idUSKBN1AK2FM [https://perma.cc/KC2H-VCUJ].
35 See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the 
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 838–39, 862 (2008); see also Darien 
Shanske, State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Can Formulary 
Apportionment Save the World?, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 191, 191–94 (2014) (discussing whether 
the dormant Commerce Clause prevents states from imposing a border tax adjustment as part 
of a carbon tax); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Why a State-Level Carbon Tax Can 
Include Border Adjustments, 83 ST. TAX NOTES 583, 585 (Feb. 2017) [hereinafter Gamage &
Shanske Why] (discussing legal conditions under which a state-level carbon tax could include 
border tax adjustments); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, A State-level Carbon Tax with 
Border Adjustments, 83 STATE TAX NOTES 911, 912, 915, 917 (Mar. 2017) [hereinafter 
Gamage & Shanske Carbon Tax] (explaining why a state-level carbon tax could legally 
include border tax adjustments).
36 S.B. 775, 2017–2018 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); see also Meredith Fowlie, 
California’s Carbon Border Wall, ENERGY INST. HAAS BLOG (May 22, 2017), https://energy
athaas.wordpress.com/2017/05/22/californias-carbon-border-wall/ [https://perma.cc/2ACT-
9C8K] (discussing the proposed border adjustment bill and the challenges it might face if 
enacted).
37 Cal. S.B. 775.
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The use of border adjustment measures has received a considerable amount 
of attention from both environmental and trade economists38 as well as trade 
lawyers and other policy analysts.39 The objective of this Article is to provide 
background to some of the economic issues associated with border adjustments, 
explain how such adjustments might be viewed by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and examine the potential for U.S. legal issues to arise as they relate to 
federal versus state regulation of climate policy.
II. ECONOMICS OF BORDER MEASURES
A. Carbon Havens and Competitiveness
Analysis of carbon leakage and international competitiveness is not new and 
is no more than a restatement of the so-called “pollution haven hypothesis.”40
The analysis can be adapted to show that the existence of a carbon haven 
depends on the stringency of domestic climate policies relative to traditional 
comparative advantage.41 Assume two countries in the world, the United States
and China, are each manufacturing two types of goods using capital and human 
capital, where type-one goods are capital-intensive in production and type-two 
goods are human capital-intensive. In addition, production of type-one goods 
generates GHG emissions while production of type-two goods is non-carbon 
intensive in production. GHG emissions are regulated through a carbon tax.
Suppose that the United States is relatively more human-capital-abundant 
than China, neither country having implemented climate policy. With trade, the 
United States will import carbon-intensive goods, and China will import non-
carbon-intensive goods from the United States.42 This result captures the 
                                                                                                                     
38 See Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon 
Leakage, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 421, 421 (2005) (discussing the extent to which market structure 
of energy-intensive industries will affect relocation of firms in response to developed country 
climate policies). See generally Carol McAusland & Nouri Najjar, The WTO Consistency of
Carbon Footprint Taxes, 61 ENVTL. RES. ECON. 37 (2015) (discussing the use of carbon 
footprint taxes on domestic goods and how they could be used to resolve issues of 
competitiveness and carbon leakage).
39 See GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM 
xi (2009) (discussing how to maximize reduction of carbon emissions while minimizing risks 
to world trade). See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax 
Adjustments Under WTO Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, & THE 
WTO 448 (Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2013) (discussing limits the WTO could 
place on competitiveness provisions in climate legislation).
40 See Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth, and the Environment, 42 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 9 (2004).
41 See BRIAN R. COPELAND & M. SCOTT TAYLOR, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 187–95 (Gene Grossman & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas eds., 2003).
42 Id.
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stylized facts—China is shifting to producing and exporting carbon-intensive 
goods, such as steel and aluminum.43
Alternatively, if the United States introduces stringent climate policy,
compared to no policy in China, production of carbon-intensive goods will 
contract in the United States and expand in China (the competitiveness effect), 
with a concomitant increase in U.S. imports and Chinese exports of carbon-
intensive goods along with carbon emissions increasing in China (carbon 
leakage) and declining in the United States.44 Consequently, there is likely to be 
lobbying in the United States for less stringent climate policy unless action is 
taken to maintain the competitiveness of U.S. production of carbon-intensive 
goods and thereby prevent carbon leakage.
B. Policy Options for Leakage and Competitiveness
While the problems of carbon leakage and competitiveness are necessarily 
interdependent, the emphasis of policy analysis in the literature has tended to be 
driven by whether it is environmentally-economic or internationally-trade-
related in focus. In the former, the focus is on the use of trade policy instruments 
as a means of solving the collective action problem, while in the latter, the focus 
is on how international competitiveness can be restored and at the same time 
ensure that a country does not violate its WTO commitments.
There has been considerable analysis of how trade policy instruments might 
be used to prevent carbon leakage when one group of countries commits to 
cooperation over climate policy, while a second group free rides by not 
implementing climate policy.45 For example, it has been shown that a social 
optimum can be obtained if countries in a coalition set common carbon taxes 
and at the same time use import tariffs (export subsidies) on all carbon-intensive 
traded goods, with the objective being to shift the international terms of trade 
against free-riding countries, thereby reducing carbon leakage.46 In principle, 
the same effect can be achieved if import tariffs and export subsidies are 
replaced with differential carbon taxes.47 Essentially, carbon taxes are lowered 
on exports (equivalent to a subsidy) and raised on imports (equivalent to a tariff) 
in order to influence the terms of trade of unregulated countries.
Empirical analysis of trade policy instruments has shown that they do have 
the potential to shift the burden of climate policy to those countries affected by 
                                                                                                                     
43 TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD: INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION AND US CLIMATE POLICY DESIGN 35 (2008).
44 See COPELAND & TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 187–95.
45 See Hoel, supra note 7, at 17–18.
46 See id. at 23–25, 29.
47 See Christoph Böhringer et al., Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of 
International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives, 110 J. PUB.
ECON. 101, 102–04 (2014).
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them.48 As a consequence, the threat of implementing such border adjustment 
measures by a coalition could result in free-riding countries choosing to adopt 
their own emissions policies rather than suffer a terms of trade loss.49 For 
example, it has been found that major polluters, such as China and Russia, could 
be motivated to join the coalition because they want to avoid the negative effects 
of border adjustment measures as well as their being highly dependent on the 
economic performance of the coalition countries.50
In terms of international competitiveness and a country’s WTO obligations, 
an interesting solution has been offered for this problem.51 Suppose the WTO 
consists of a two-stage tariff negotiation game between the United States and 
China, where, before negotiations begin, existing climate policies of each 
country are noted.52 At the first stage of the game, bound tariffs are negotiated, 
implying a set of market access commitments by the two countries.53 At the 
second stage of the game, the two countries make unilateral changes to their mix 
of policies, providing that tariffs do not exceed their bound level, with implied 
market access commitments being maintained.54
What happens if the preferred choice of climate policy in the United States
affects its competitiveness, resulting in an increase in China’s market access in 
energy-intensive goods? In order to maintain its negotiated market access 
commitments, the United States would need to raise tariffs on these products
above their bound level, which it is unable to do under WTO rules.55 It has been 
argued that resolution of this problem lies in providing more flexibility to the 
current rules by allowing countries to renegotiate their bound tariffs if unilateral 
changes in their climate policies increase market access.56
There is an interesting question as to whether the existing WTO rules allow
for the flexibility suggested or whether they could be changed in this regard. It 
has been argued that under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Article XXVIII, a unilateral increase in the bound tariff by one country can be 
met by the other country withdrawing an equivalent amount of market access.57
                                                                                                                     
48 Christoph Böhringer et al., The Role of Border Carbon Adjustment in Unilateral 
Climate Policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum Study (EMF 29), 34 ENERGY ECON.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) S97, S109 (2012).
49 See Böhringer et al., supra note 47, at 102.
50 See Christoph Böhringer et al., The Strategic Value of Carbon Tariffs, 8 AM. ECON.
J.: ECON. POL’Y 28, 39–44 (2016).
51 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, 
and International Economic Institutions, 116 Q.J. ECON. 519, 557–59 (2001).
52 See id. at 545–46.
53 Id.
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 553–54.
56 See id.
57 Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: 
Lessons from the Past, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 525, 527–28 (1998); see General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXVIII Interpretation and Application of WTO 
Agreements, 947 (1994) https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994
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Such renegotiation would leave the terms of trade unchanged and would also 
satisfy the principle of reciprocity.58 Alternatively, it has been argued that the 
renegotiation provisions of GATT Article XXVIII could be changed such that 
any change in, say, a country’s domestic climate policies would be offered to 
the other country in compensation for raising the bound tariff.59 In other words, 
even though the terms of trade have changed, market access is maintained at the 
negotiated level due to the impact of the climate policies on domestic firms.60
III. WTO CONSISTENCY OF BORDER MEASURES
A. Legal Issues
While the argument that using trade policy instruments to resolve a market 
failure is compelling theoretically, it has raised practical concerns that border 
measures such as taxes could be used for protectionist ends and would therefore 
be constrained by current WTO rules. More generally, there is uncertainty about 
the compatibility of border taxes and WTO rules and the associated design of 
these policies; for example, determining the carbon content of imported goods 
from countries where environmental policies are either non-existent or are more 
lax than those applied in the importing country.61 In this context, however, there 
is a different justification for dealing with border measures: a border tax (or 
tariff) is imposed on imported goods, while a border tax adjustment (BTA) is 
the imposition of a domestically imposed tax on like imported goods.62
Essentially GATT Article II:2(a) allows members of the WTO to place on the 
imports of any product, a tax equivalent to an internal tax.63
The basic idea of adjusting taxes at the border in the presence of domestic 
taxes is not new.64 Such taxes have been applied at borders since the late
eighteenth century, and the underlying principle for them has long been 
recognized. For example, political economist David Ricardo noted, “In the 
degree then in which [domestic] taxes raise the price of corn, a duty should be 
imposed on its importation . . . [b]y means of this duty . . . trade would be 
                                                                                                                     
_art28_gatt47.pdf [https://perma.cc/74Q5-KJAN].
58 Roessler, supra note 57, at 527.
59 See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 51, at 558.
60 See id. at 557–58.
61 See Peter Holmes et al., Border Carbon Adjustments and the Potential for 
Protectionism, 11 CLIMATE POL’Y 883, 884 (2012).
62 See TRADE AND CLIMATE, supra note 20, at 103.
63 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GATT 1994–
ARTICLE II (JURISPRUDENCE), 1, 18–19 (1994) https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publicatio
ns_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art2_jur.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET92-26K7].
64 See Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without the 
USA: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 289,
291–92 (2005).
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placed on the same footing as if it had never been taxed.”65 The key phrase here 
is that any BTA should result in imports remaining at the same level as before 
implementation of the domestic tax.
Even though BTAs have a long history, it was formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in the mid-1950s and its subsequent 
implementation of a destination-based system of value added tax (VAT) that 
stimulated discussion of adjustment at the border for such an internal tax 
system.66 There were contributions by economists at the time showing that 
movement between an origin and a destination base for VAT (or any other sales 
tax) would have no real effects on trade, production, and consumption.67
The basic argument was as follows: assuming application of VAT is broadly 
based with a single rate, it does not matter which way it is implemented as there 
are no changes in the relative prices faced by consumers or firms.68 In other 
words, BTAs for VAT would have no effects on trade, consumption, and 
production because their effects would be fully offset by adjustments in price 
levels, wages, and/or exchange rates across countries.69 Subsequent work 
extended this analysis to show that with either endogenous exchange rates, 
flexible prices across countries, or flexible wage rates within countries, changes 
in the tax basis would be offset by changes in real wages or changes in the price 
level.70
The key point of the analysis is the idea that a BTA may be neutral in its 
effects on trade, and this of course lies at the heart of the legal discussion of such 
taxes. In its 1970 report, the GATT Working Party defined BTAs as “any fiscal 
measure which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle (i.e., 
which enable . . . imported products sold to consumers to be charged with some 
or all of the tax charged in the importing country in respect of similar domestic 
products).”71 The objectives of such taxes are “to ensure trade neutrality of 
domestic taxation . . . and thus to preserve the competitive equality between 
domestic and imported products.”72
The key language in these two paragraphs of course concerns whether BTAs 
are imposed on imported products that are similar to the domestic product and 
whether they are neutral in terms of their impact on trade and thereby maintain 
the competitiveness of domestic producers.
                                                                                                                     
65 See 4 David Ricardo, On the Effects of Taxes Imposed on a Particular Commodity,
in THE WORKS & CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 132, 132 (1951) (ebook).
66 See Biermann & Brohm, supra note 64, at 292.
67 See Ben Lockwood & John Whalley, Carbon-Motivated Border Tax Adjustments: 
Old Wine in Green Bottles?, 33 WORLD ECON. 810, 815–18 (2008).
68 Id. at 811–12.
69 Id. at 816.
70 See Ben Lockwood et al., When Are Origin and Destination Regimes Equivalent?, 1 
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 5, 10 (1994).
71 Comm. On Trade & Env’t, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and Charges for 
Environmental Purposes-Border Tax Adjustments, at 7, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/47 (May 2, 
1997) [https://perma.cc/PB9U-JUWR].
72 Id. at 6.
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BTAs are normally implemented with respect to taxes on final goods, e.g., 
domestic excise taxes are levied on goods such as alcohol and cigarettes, and 
equivalent taxes are then levied at the border on imports of such goods.73 In 
principle, however, there is nothing to prevent a country from also applying a 
BTA for taxes on inputs such as energy used in production of a final good such 
as aluminum.74 The United States already has such a tax regime in place applied 
to ozone depleting chemicals (ODCs).75 An environmental excise tax was 
imposed in 1989–1990 on the domestic production of a range of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a BTA also being applied to the import of such 
chemicals as well as the import of manufactured products that either contain 
CFCs or use them in their production process.76
The implementation of BTAs raises the important distinction between 
application to final goods and application to final goods produced using carbon-
intensive inputs. This is of course the highly controversial issue of trade 
measures applied on the basis of process and production methods (PPMs). 
Importantly, while no WTO ruling has ever been rendered on the application by 
the United States of BTAs to final goods containing CFCs,77 which is clearly 
process related, BTAs on final goods that embody carbon emissions are likely 
to be highly contentious–notwithstanding the WTO Appellate Body’s findings 
in the Shrimp-Turtle case.78
Potential challenges to countries seeking to implement BTAs will come 
under GATT Article III, and if found inconsistent with WTO obligations, BTAs 
may be still justifiable under GATT Article XX. Nevertheless, it has been 
argued that “[t]he legal issues are, however, less than clear-cut, with long-
standing divergence in views among WTO Members.”79
As there are now several detailed legal commentaries in the literature on 
this issue, only a brief outline is presented here.80 GATT Article III:1 and III:2
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(National Treatment) are the rules that oblige WTO members not to discriminate 
against imports from other members when applying internal laws and 
regulations.81 The key language in GATT Article III:2 states that imported 
products “shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to 
like domestic products.”82
Consequently, a 20% BTA on imported diesel fuel to adjust for a 20%
domestic excise tax on diesel fuel would clearly be consistent with GATT 
Article III:2. The 1970 GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments also 
made it clear that indirect taxes levied on products such as diesel fuel were 
eligible for border tax adjustment, while direct taxes such as payroll taxes were 
not.83
While the WTO position on BTAs on final goods seems quite clear, it is 
much less clear that GATT Article III:2 will allow BTAs on final goods that 
embody carbon, given the imposition of domestic taxes on GHG emissions. The 
GATT Working Party was actually unable to agree on the legality of such 
measures, also noting a “scarcity of complaints” about such measures, and it 
was not until the 1987 Superfund case that this issue was reexamined by the 
GATT.84 This case was a challenge by Canada, the EEC, and Mexico against 
U.S. taxes being levied on certain imported chemicals as well as substances that 
were end-products of chemicals being taxed in the United States under the U.S.
Superfund Act.85 Essentially, the GATT panel ruled that the rate of tax on the 
imported substances was equivalent to the tax borne by the like domestic 
substances, given the tax on chemicals, and therefore was consistent with GATT 
Article III:2.86 As noted, the ruling focused on the notion that the U.S.
Superfund Act imposed the same “fiscal burden” on imported and like domestic 
substances, and not on whether the substances subject to the BTA were similar 
to the chemicals subject to the domestic tax.87 Irrespective of the GATT ruling 
in the Superfund case, it is likely that the key issue still remains as to whether a 
BTA for domestic climate policy will fall under the aegis of GATT Article III:2, 
i.e., what goods are being compared for “likeness,” and can imported and 
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domestic goods be compared given differences in the amount of carbon 
embodied in the final product?
As noted earlier, even if a BTA for domestic climate policy is deemed 
inconsistent with GATT Article III:2, it may still be possible to justify it under 
GATT Article XX (General Exceptions).88 Both GATT/WTO panels and the 
WTO Appellate Body have adopted the following two-tier test to determine 
whether any border measure is justified under GATT Article XX: (1) does the 
measure fall within the scope of GATT Article XX – specifically, is such a 
measure “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or “does it 
relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption;” and (2) that the measure is “not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”89
Whether or not BTAs are covered by GATT Article XX:(g) will depend on 
there being shown to be a reasonable means of achieving the ends, i.e., 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.90 In addition, interpretation of 
how the Chapeau of GATT Article XX might be applied to such border 
adjustments will depend on the following: (1) the requirement, as indicated by 
the WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case, that members of the WTO 
pursue multilateral agreements on environmental issues; (2) whether special and 
differential treatment can be expected in the application of border adjustments, 
based on whether the imported good comes from a developed or developing 
country; and (3) when application of the border measure fails to take proper 
account of the comparative effectiveness of measures and policies applied in the 
exporting country.91
The conclusion to be drawn here is that there continues to be significant 
debate about the outcome of any WTO Dispute Settlement Panel on the issue of 
BTAs, and that this will only be settled via an actual ruling. However, based on 
discussion in the literature, it seems reasonable to assume that any final legal 
interpretation could go one of following two ways: on the one hand, BTAs are 
found inconsistent with GATT Article III:2, but the door is left open for 
countries to justify the measure under GATT Article XX; on the other hand, 
they are found to be consistent with GATT Article III:2.92
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B. Unintended Consequences of BTAs
While carbon leakage and competitiveness are closely connected in the 
climate policy debate, the latter is a rather more difficult concept to define and 
one which has been largely side-stepped in the climate literature, but it is 
particularly pertinent if industries that face domestic environmental taxes are 
imperfectly competitive, as is likely to be the case with the energy-intensive 
industries such as steel, aluminum, and cement production.93 In this context, 
competitiveness could be thought of in terms of market share and/or the profit 
of producers, which in turn are a function of the specific characteristics of an 
industry subject to domestic climate policy, including factors such as market 
structure, industry technology, and the nature of competition between 
producers. This suggests that climate policy and BTAs are perhaps best 
analyzed in the context of the literature on trade and environmental policy.94
The key point of this previous literature is that if producers earn positive 
economic profits, implementation of climate policy may have the effect of 
shifting profits between domestic and foreign producers, thereby affecting the 
former’s competitiveness.
This possibility has been examined in the context of U.S. aluminum 
production, which is characterized by a small number of dominant firms: the 
industry has repeatedly been investigated by the antitrust authorities for anti-
competitive behavior, and there is empirical evidence that firms in the sector 
behave less than competitively.95 The industry has also been identified as one 
that might be vulnerable to the issue of competitiveness due to the fact that it is 
both energy-intensive and also highly exposed to international competition, 
most notably from Canadian imports.96 Interestingly, Canadian aluminum 
production is less carbon-intensive compared to that in the United States, where 
energy is being supplied by hydro-electric power plants.97
Empirical research shows that even though border measures can break the 
link between competitiveness and carbon leakage, U.S. users of aluminum may 
suffer a deadweight loss due to aggregate output of aluminum being reduced in 
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an imperfectly competitive setting.98 Specifically, the impact of BTAs is 
sensitive to how competitive equality is defined. For example, if a BTA is set to 
restore the previous volume of imports, carbon leakage is prevented, but U.S. 
firms suffer a loss of market share and profits are shifted to their Canadian 
competitors. In contrast, if a BTA is set to restore the previous market share of 
imports, there is negative carbon leakage as both U.S. and Canadian firms 
reduce output, i.e., the BTA “facilitates” collusion. While it is appropriate that 
aluminum prices increase in order to reflect the social cost of carbon emissions, 
there is a risk that anti-competitive behavior may be exacerbated.99 This 
highlights an important practical tension between targeting an environmental 
market failure in the presence of a second market failure, market power, and at 
the same time ensuring that border measures are not protectionist.100 Of course, 
policymakers may consider the tradeoff between the benefits of lower emissions 
and no leakage and the costs of increased market power to be worthwhile, but it 
is nonetheless a second-best outcome and one that could result in costly anti-
trust investigations.101
IV. FEDERAL VS. STATE REGULATION OF BORDER MEASURES
A. Legal Challenges
As yet, there has been no in-depth economic analysis of state border 
measures such as those proposed in California’s Senate Bill 775. However, both 
legal and economic observers have suggested that any border measure will 
likely be subject to legal challenge from within the state, under the dormant 
Commerce Clause, and potentially from the WTO.102
In terms of federal versus state regulation, the dormant Commerce Clause 
and associated dormant Foreign Commerce Clause are the two potential 
constitutional constraints to state-level border measures.103 The interstate 
version of the dormant Commerce Clause can be used to invalidate a measure, 
such as a BTA, as being unconstitutional in three ways.104 First, it would be 
considered per se invalid if it facially discriminates against out-of-state 
commerce, unless it can be shown that there is no other means of accomplishing 
a legitimate state objective.105 Second, if it is not found to be facially 
discriminatory, the law would still be considered invalid if its purpose or effect 
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is still discriminatory.106 Third, even if it is facially neutral, it would be invalid 
if it creates an undue burden on interstate commerce.107 The legal logic of the 
dormant Commerce Clause is very straightforward: it is designed to invalidate 
any protectionist state laws, represent the interests of out-of-staters, and promote 
national unity.108
The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is the logical requirement that state 
laws must be held constitutional when applied to foreign trade–essentially, such 
laws should neither increase the risk of multiple taxation nor should they 
undermine the ability of the United States to speak “with one voice in foreign 
affairs.”109 In the case of multiple taxation, the argument is that in imposing a 
tax at the state level that affects foreign trade, there is the risk of double taxation 
because of taxes already being imposed abroad.110 The second argument focuses 
on the idea that there should be uniformity in the Federal Government’s dealings 
with other countries and that state-level taxation could frustrate the goal of 
federal uniformity with the potential for foreign retaliation.111
On the face of it, it would seem likely that border measures would be struck 
down by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, it has been argued that because 
state level climate policy, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), necessarily requires a border measure in order to solve the problem of 
leakage, it would be considered facially discriminatory under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.112 There is also doubt about whether the so-called 
“compensatory” (or “complementary”) tax doctrine would be a legitimate 
defense of any border measures.113 The compensatory tax doctrine allows a state 
to apply a discriminatory tax if it is designed to achieve a legitimate state 
objective that cannot be achieved in a way that is non-discriminatory.114 To 
satisfy this doctrine, the tax on interstate commerce would have to be 
“substantially equivalent” to that imposed on intrastate trade.115 Some legal 
observers argue that it would be challenging to establish a uniform way of 
measuring emissions from in-state electricity generation as compared to out-of-
state generation in order to satisfy the “equivalent burdens” dimension of the 
compensatory tax doctrine.116
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Other legal commentators take a different view, arguing that BTAs might 
be legally defensible under the dormant Commerce Clause.117 They suggest 
there are three questions of legal doctrine that have to be answered: first, is it 
possible to apply a BTA on all state imports, even if it is non-discriminatory; 
second, is it possible for a state to have a BTA that discriminates between 
imported goods based on approximations of their carbon intensity, where 
approximations take geography into account, i.e., the source of the imported 
good(s); and third, if the answers to the first and second questions are yes, how 
much approximation of the carbon-intensity of imports would be allowed in 
calculation of a BTA?118
If a state tax discriminates between in-state and out-of-state taxpayers, then 
the possibility of applying different BTAs based on the carbon footprint of 
imports seems unlikely to satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court, in which case the two 
other questions are moot.119 Notwithstanding this initial conclusion, there is a 
counterargument that no facial discrimination exists in the case of a BTA.120
The argument draws on a case concerning California’s existing cap-and-trade 
program AB 32, where the California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted a 
low carbon fuel standard, the standard differentiating fuels by region on the 
basis of their carbon intensity.121 Initially the standard was struck down in 
federal district court on the grounds that applying the standard based on regional 
source was a facial discrimination.122 A Ninth Circuit panel then overturned the 
district court, arguing that there was no facial discrimination due to the 
California standard targeting imports not because they were from out-of-state, 
but because of their carbon intensity.123 The conclusion drawn is that because a 
carbon tax is necessary to resolve a market failure, and one that cannot succeed 
without BTAs, it should not be struck down by the courts as per se
discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause.124
It has also been argued that a court might accept an argument that a BTA is 
justified under the compensatory tax doctrine.125 If a uniform BTA were 
charged on all imports, it might satisfy the doctrine, the precedent being 
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
the state of Washington’s imposition of a use tax on out-of-state purchases.126
The key issue then becomes what if the BTA is based on the carbon intensity of 
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imports? A BTA would have to pass the three-pronged test applied in Oregon 
Waste Systems Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon.127 First, 
a BTA would have to be based on an identified event (carbon emissions); 
second, the effect of carbon emissions would need to be shown to be 
substantially equivalent wherever they occur; and third, the BTA must 
approximate but not exceed the level charged in-state.128
A BTA would satisfy the first and second prongs of the test, but might fail
the third based on the ruling in Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman.129
In the latter case, Missouri imposed an average 1.5% use tax at the state level in 
order to compensate for different tax rates applied by 1,000 localities, the U.S. 
Supreme Court finding that the average use tax did not eliminate discrimination 
in transactions where imported goods were charged more than local goods.130 It 
can be argued, though, that in the case of a BTA, carbon intensity can only be 
calculated approximately, and hence would necessarily meet the third prong of 
the test.131 Here they appeal to the concept of fair apportionment, drawing on 
Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury.132 In this case, the plaintiffs 
argued that in applying its VAT, Michigan’s method for locating value-added 
of firms who operated both within and out-of-state was unreasonable, an 
argument the Court dismissed, Michigan being permitted to use an approximate 
formula.133 A BTA should be treated by the same logic: if Michigan can use a 
formula to track down value added, something similar would apply to BTAs and 
carbon intensity.134
Although BTAs applied by U.S. states could pass a legal challenge through 
the dormant Commerce Clause, it is also recognized that BTAs may raise issues 
concerning international trade, with the potential to cause problems for the U.S. 
government, and could therefore “run[] afoul of the foreign dormant commerce 
clause.”135 As noted earlier, there is considerable debate as to whether BTAs are 
consistent with WTO law and how the WTO would actually rule in this instance, 
and so it is not clear whether the U.S. government would seek a court ruling that 
border measures are unconstitutional under the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause. Of course, that does not mean that the courts would not seek to apply 
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause if there were a challenge to a state-level 
BTA through the WTO dispute settlement system. Precedent for this can be seen 
with respect to the Massachusetts Burma Law (MBL) of 1996 which prevented 
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agencies and branches of the state’s government from contracting with 
businesses that were on a “restricted purchasing list” because they were doing 
business with Burma (now Myanmar).136
In 1997, both the EU and Japan lodged complaints with the WTO asserting
that the MBL was in violation of the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement.137 Subsequently, the WTO dispute settlement panel was suspended 
following a ruling by the First Circuit in National Foreign Trade Council v. 
Natsios.138 The court held that MBL was invalid on the following three grounds: 
first, it interfered with the dormant foreign affairs power; second, it was a 
violation of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause; and third, it was pre-
empted by sanctions that the United States had already enacted against
Burma.139 However, following U.S. Supreme Court decisions in American 
Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,
the Court would seem most likely to rule against BTAs on the grounds of 
executive preemption by the Federal Government as opposed to the dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause.140
B. Current Status of U.S. Federal Climate Policy
In light of the previous discussion, it is interesting to evaluate the current 
administration’s position on climate policy. During the 2016 presidential 
election campaign, Hillary Clinton reminded voters that her opponent, Donald 
Trump, had once tweeted, “[t]he concept of global warming was created by and 
for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”141 In 
August 2017, President Trump followed up his rhetoric by announcing that the 
United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement.142
The clear inference to be drawn from this is that federal climate policy will 
not be enacted anytime soon, and the Administration is also backing away from 
its international commitments to reduce carbon emissions. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the Federal Government will seek a ruling against state-level BTAs 
on the grounds of executive preemption. Ironically, recent economic analysis of 
the Paris Agreement after President Trump’s action suggests other countries’
reaction to the choice of the United States might actually provoke a protectionist 
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response that has nothing to do with climate change and everything to do with 
the Administration’s overtly protectionist stance and desire to maintain 
employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector.143
Withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement has 
resulted in calls for other countries to implement sanctions against U.S. exports 
of carbon-intensive goods through using BTAs or “carbon tariffs,” the objective 
being to punish the United States for free-riding and force them back into the 
global coalition.144 However, there is “an inconvenient insight” relating to this 
possibility, drawing on the idea that a country such as the United States can 
exercise its international market power through tariffs.145 Any BTAs levied 
against the United States will actually be counter-productive if the United States 
chooses to retaliate causing a trade war.146 The results of empirical analysis 
show that China would lose most from a tariff war due to the fact that U.S. use 
of retaliatory tariffs will result in significant deterioration in China’s
international terms of trade, which will hurt it as a trade-intensive economy.147
Even if the United States is worse off in a tariff war than it would be under the 
Paris Agreement, the ability of the United States to retaliate and punish China 
fits well with President Trump’s view of China as competing unfairly with the 
U.S. manufacturing sector and hurting U.S. workers.
V. CONCLUSION
Absent a binding international agreement to reduce carbon emissions, many 
countries, regions, and individual states that unilaterally implement climate 
policy are seeking to resolve the problems of carbon leakage and reduced 
competitiveness through the use of border measures. In the case of the United 
States, there is the potential for implementation by states of border measures 
such as BTAs to be found unconstitutional under both the dormant Commerce 
and Foreign Commerce Clauses, i.e., they would be found both per se
discriminatory and also have the potential for foreign retaliation if in violation 
of WTO law. The discussion in this Article shows that the latter outcome is not 
necessarily guaranteed in light of current interpretation of both U.S. and WTO 
law. However, the current U.S. political climate suggests that use of carbon 
tariffs by other signatories to the Paris Climate Agreement might actually play 
into President Trump’s protectionist rhetoric.
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